

## DEMOCRACY OR TRUMP: OUR CHOICES NOW

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First published in:

Sinister Wisdom

Issue 110

Fall 2018

It is an old truism that people rob banks and steal elections because that's where the money is. But in America today we are facing a president and many congress people who want to steal our whole government, gut it, and shut down its services and protections that enable most of us to enjoy a decent life—public education, health care, social security, environmental safeguards, you name it. As documented by Nancy MacLean in *Democracy in Chains*,<sup>11</sup> some wealthy individuals have been working toward this for decades, intentionally in secret because they knew their objectives would be rejected by most Americans, conservative, liberal, and middle of the road.

President Trump serves the financial elite who would prefer oligarchy to democracy. Was he elected? I doubt it, but he was proclaimed the winner because we, the people, had already been shut out of our role as active participants in self-government and our right to oversee our election infrastructure. Will Trump get a second term? That's up to us, and how hard we work between now and 2020 to prevent it.

I worked for six years as a full-time, unpaid, independent activist against electronic voting because I knew computers could produce any election results their programmers wanted. But along the way I learned so much more about how elections can be manipulated.

I heard about electronic voting for the first time in June, 2003. I was a New Yorker, computer professional, age 59, attending a public forum sponsored by several good government groups: Common Cause, the League of Women Voters, New York Public Interest Research Group, and others. The panelists agreed that America needed computerized voting so people with disabilities

<sup>11</sup> Nancy MacLean, *Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right's Stealth Plan for America* (New York: Viking, 2017).

could vote independently without direct personal assistance. They said computerized voting would be more modern, as well as more secure and accurate, than the mechanical lever voting machines then in use by most Americans. In fact, the panelists said, computers used for voting would not need to be audited nor the tallies verified.

I had been an Election Day poll worker and loved lever voting machines. They were the size of a huge refrigerator, weighed 700 pounds, and worked like a giant box containing row upon row of old-fashioned, mechanical adding machines. They had rods and gears inside that were as large, visible, and understandable as the parts of a simple bicycle. Invented in the late 1800s to curb cheating in the counting of votes, they could work for hundreds of years with routine maintenance. Thus they were inexpensive.

Each lever machine served a maximum of 999 voters because the counters only went that high, so to change the outcome of an election would require many people to spend many nights in the warehouse with keys to open the machines and tools to move the rods or damage the gears. But that tampering would be easily visible. As a result, after the introduction of lever machines, political parties relied on other ways to ensure the election results they wanted, for example to control who the candidates were, gerrymander districts, or cancel opponents' voter registrations. Partisan employees at an elections board could send broken machines to districts where opponents' supporters voted. Indeed, broken lever machines had been delivered to some New York poll sites in past elections. Strangely, the panelists at the forum insisted this would never happen with computers.

I raised my hand, stood up, and said that I had worked with computers since 1967 and there was no such thing as a secure computer outside of *Star Trek*. In the companies I worked for, computer accuracy was the result of verification procedures conducted 24/7. Information similar to votes on a specific ballot was called a "transaction" and was followed through a computer system and

verified via tracking numbers. But tracking numbers could not be used in voting if you wanted a "secret ballot"—any form of voting that prevents a voter's choices from being traced back to him or her. Most states adopted the secret ballot to prevent vote selling and to protect voters from being beaten up, or losing their job or apartment, after voting for the "wrong" candidate.

The international standard for election legitimacy was whether ordinary people could meaningfully observe the casting, handling, storage, and counting of votes, so they could see that procedures were honest. Votes in a computer would be modern, yes, but unobservable.

I'd spent six months on a project with 300 engineers and programmers including some who were wheelchair users, blind, or deaf. They worked as productively as their co-workers by using various assistive gadgets. For example, a blind engineer showed me how to use his text-to-speech reader that looked like a stethoscope; I moved the sensor across his computer screen while a voice read the words to me. Voters with disabilities didn't need computers in order to vote independently because the same accessories they used with computers would work with any voting machine. An inexpensive, computerized front panel with assistive gadgets on one side for voters with disabilities, and mechanical gadgets on the other to turn the levers, would make lever machines accessible.

As the forum ended a man handed me a flyer for an upcoming hearing. I went home and created a voting machine simulation program called The Fraudulent Voting Machine, nicknamed *Fraudo*, that ran on a laptop. *Fraudo* conducts an election for president with two candidates, John Doe and Mary Smith. *Fraudo* works two ways. When you run a "pre-election test" the tallies and audit report are accurate. When you run a "real election" *Fraudo* falsifies the tallies and audit report so Mary always wins. I thought all those nice good government people were simply ignorant, and I'd educate them.

I demonstrated Fraudo at the hearing; when people saw the corrupted tallies, they screamed. Apparently they had never seen a computer produce wrong results before, unlike the people I worked with who saw it daily and had to fix the errors before their company sent out incorrect bills or statements. Someone gave me a flyer announcing a voting security conference in Denver two weeks later. I booked a flight, and Fraudo and I went national.

Over the next six years I helped New York City comply in the best available way with federal law that required accessible voting for people with disabilities. New York State, which had been expected to purchase unverifiable electronic voting machines, selected recountable paper ballots and scanners with a 3% audit required after each election. I wrote two resolutions on voting equipment that passed the New York City Council, and was credited with writing eight provisions of New York State election law. I spoke before dozens of organizations including political clubs and unions, testified at hearings, and trained hundreds of others to speak at hearings also. I traveled to conferences to speak and hand out information, and saved documents on my website, [WheresThePaper.org](http://WheresThePaper.org). Fraudo is still there, but browsers no longer run programs of that kind (Java 1.2). I worked in tandem with an upstate group, New Yorkers for Verified Voting, [nyvv.org](http://nyvv.org).

My work against electronic voting was influenced by my parents, Jews who managed to leave Germany before World War II. They taught me and my two brothers to listen to everyone's point of view, pay attention to what the government does, and make sure our democracy represents us by participating. We lived in a semi-rural area near St. Louis, Missouri; in 1952 my older brother Teddy, aged 8, marched down our little street with an "I LIKE IKE" sign; my parents didn't object, though they supported Stevenson.

In 1962, at eighteen, I moved to New York City and got a job as a clerk sorting paper documents and filing them alphabetically in metal file cabinets. Big companies were starting to replace paper

files with computers; in 1967 a firm trained me to be a programmer. Later I taught programming. Then I sold mainframe computers for a corporation that trained me in presentation and persuasion techniques. That was a turning point—soon after quitting that job I used my new skills as an activist.

For three years in the mid-1970s I volunteered with the New York State Women's Lobby, a coalition of thirteen organizations that worked to revise New York's sex-biased state laws. I learned about feminism and activism, edited the newsletter, made speeches, and led lobbying trips. I trained women to meet legislators: shake hands; state their name, objectives, and personal reasons for supporting our legislation; and ask for the lawmaker's commitment. We needed people outside the legislative office building to chant, wave signs, and raise their fists. We needed calm, articulate people inside to explain why the crowds were out there and what we wanted.

In 1975 a group called the New York Coalition for Equal Rights formed to campaign for an Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the state constitution; it would be on the ballot that November. I made speeches and raised funds. Along with my heroine Congresswoman Bella Abzug I spoke to a crowd of 10,000 in Bryant Park. (My hands shook, I dropped my notes, but I did it.) New York's ERA failed in the election, but the Women's Lobby succeeded, piecemeal, in making our laws fair for both women and men. Mission accomplished! I retired to private life.

After the presidential election in 2000, the nationwide public relations campaign against hanging chads alarmed me. Chads are tiny rectangles or ovals of paper that voters punch out of a ballot card next to their candidate's name. Those that "hang" are ones that don't completely detach. But the purpose of a ballot is to clearly record the voter's intent; punched card ballots did that whether the chads detached or hung. Something bad was happening, though I couldn't figure out what it meant or what to do about it.

The "something bad" came two years later: the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) which most states interpreted as requiring computerized voting. I didn't know about HAVA until that forum I attended in June 2003. Nor did I know that a few states had already used such equipment in the 2002 midterm elections when Republicans secured control of Congress—and that some people suspected it had been used to switch votes because over a dozen Democrats, favored to win in pre-election polls, lost with vote swings of up to 16 points.<sup>1</sup>

Fast forward: in 2016 about a third of Americans voted on touch screen or pushbutton machines.<sup>2</sup> With this equipment voters touch a screen or push a button on the face of a computer to indicate their votes, and the computer handles everything after that. Are the votes recorded and counted correctly? No one—voters, election administrators, observers, or candidates—can see. Hence published reports of failure are few and limited to those that cause long lines and frustrate would-be voters.<sup>3</sup> Meanwhile, dozens of computer science studies say this

1 Alastair Thompson, "American Coup: Mid-Term Election Polls vs. Actuals," *Scoop*, November 12, 2002, <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0211/S00078.htm>.

2 These machines, whether they let voters indicate their votes by touching a screen or pushing a pushbutton, are known as "DREs" which stands for "Direct Recording Electronic" voting machines. They mimic the function of lever voting machines which are "direct recording mechanical." However, lever machines are single-purpose mechanical devices; in over 100 years of use, a culture of fraud never developed around them because they are too cumbersome to tamper with and a person with brief training can look in the back and see any problems. In contrast, DREs invite fraud because it can be accomplished (1) without leaving any evidence and (2) without requiring physical access to the computer due to its wireless and internet communications capability. Drew DeSilver, "On Election Day, most voters use electronic or optical-scan ballots," Pew Research Center, November 8, 2016, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/08/on-election-day-most-voters-use-electronic-or-optical-scan-ballots/>.

3 "Electronic Voting: a Failed Experiment, Direct Record Electronic (DRE) Voting Machine Failures Reported in the News," VotersUnite, March 10, 2007, <http://www.votersunite.org/info/DREFailedExperiment.pdf>.

equipment doesn't meet basic professional standards and allows easy changes to votes and tallies.<sup>4</sup>

Some touch screen and pushbutton machines have a "paper trail," a paper printout displayed through a window that looks like a cash register receipt and lists the voter's choices. After the voter verifies the printout, it falls into a locked box so it can be used after the election to verify computer tallies. The paper trail idea failed<sup>5</sup> for three reasons. First, most voters can't verify accurately—in a Rice University study two thirds of test voters didn't notice that eight races they had voted on were not displayed for verification.<sup>6</sup> Second, election administrators objected that they weren't given budgets to count paper trail votes, and those procedures would keep them from certifying election results within the legal timeframe.<sup>7</sup> Third, many of the printers sold by voting machine vendors were so shoddy they couldn't print 200 slips of paper in a 12-hour election day.<sup>8</sup> Because similar printers operated with near

4 Ben Wofford, "How to Hack an Election in 7 Minutes," *Politico Magazine*, August 5, 2016, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/08/2016-elections-russia-hack-how-to-hack-an-election-in-seven-minutes-214144>. See also John Schwartz, "Computer Voting Is Open to Easy Fraud, Experts Say," *New York Times*, July 24, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/24/us/computer-voting-is-open-to-easy-fraud-experts-say.html>. See also Rady Ananda, "Annotated Bibliography of Expert Reports on Voting Systems," *WheresThePaper*, December 11, 2007, <http://www.wheresthepaper.org/DecRadyAnandaTechReports.pdf>.

5 Teresa Hommel, "Paper Trails: A Good Idea That Failed," *WheresThePaper.org*, May 26, 2009, [http://www.wheresthepaper.org/VVPAT\\_Idea\\_Failed.pdf](http://www.wheresthepaper.org/VVPAT_Idea_Failed.pdf).

6 Sarah P. Everett, "The Usability of Electronic Voting Machines and How Votes Can Be Changed Without Detection," Rice University, Houston, Texas, May 2007, <http://www.wheresthepaper.org/SarahPEverettDissertation.pdf>. See, especially, discussions on pages 77 and 103.

7 Doug Lewis, "Testimony of Doug Lewis, Executive Director, National Association of Election Officials - The Election Center," House Administration Elections Hearing, March 20, 2007, [http://www.wheresthepaper.org/HouseAdminTestimonyDougLewis3\\_20\\_2007.pdf](http://www.wheresthepaper.org/HouseAdminTestimonyDougLewis3_20_2007.pdf).

8 One example is Joe Guillen, "20 percent of election printouts were unreadable, Officials fear disaster in Cuyahoga County during primary vote," *The Plain Dealer Cleveland.com*, November 28, 2007, [http://www.wheresthepaper.org/PlainDealero71128\\_20PercentElectionPrintoutsUnreadable.htm](http://www.wheresthepaper.org/PlainDealero71128_20PercentElectionPrintoutsUnreadable.htm).

perfection in cash registers and gas pumps across America, some activists speculated that vendors delivered faulty printers to avoid creating evidence of their voting machines' malfunction.

In 2016 roughly half of Americans voted with paper ballots and scanners.<sup>9</sup> The voters use a pen to make a computer-readable mark next to their candidates' names and then insert the ballot into a scanner, a computer that reads the marks and counts the votes. The ballot is a first-hand paper record of the voter's choices, but if the scanner's ballot programming has errors it can credit votes to the wrong candidates ("vote-switching") or not count all the votes. Calibration errors can make the scanner look in the wrong place on the ballot for the voter's mark, pick up smudges as votes, or fail to count marks that are not big or dark enough. A report in 2009 listed 186 scanner failures,<sup>10</sup> and those were only the ones that were noticed and publicized.

If scanned paper ballots are taken out of observers' view at the close of polls, when they are recounted some days later we can't know if they are the same ballots or altered. Think of the many ways paper money can be protected—or stolen—and apply that to ballots. Some scanners produce electronic ballot images to be used in recounts; insiders can leave work with memory sticks from many scanners in their briefcase, and use their laptop at home to switch votes.

In 2016, about a fifth of voters lived in jurisdictions with both touch screen or pushbutton machines and paper ballots with scanners.<sup>11</sup> Only 0.1% of voters lived in jurisdictions using hand-counted paper ballots,<sup>12</sup> where typically at the close of polls the

local residents show up to be counters or observers, and produce the tallies within a few hours. The manageability of hand counts correlates to the number of voters served at each table (also called a ward, precinct, or election district), not to the population of the city or state.

We use scanners these days to grade tests for school kids and read marks on lottery tickets. In stores we hold the bar code of a product near a scanner to get the price. We are accustomed to scanners that work. In 2016, however, we were asked to believe that in Michigan, where Trump's margin of victory was 10,704 votes, there were 75,335 ballots with no vote for president.<sup>13</sup> The number of such ballots was suspiciously high in many other states.<sup>14</sup> Did so many people go to the polls and not vote for president? The unlikely numbers nationwide begged for open confirmation; immediate hand-counts should have been done before the ballots could be modified. Manual counts of votes *in a single contest* are simpler and faster than feeding ballots through the same scanners that may have miscounted on Election Day.

In 2016 in Detroit, 80 broken scanners caused errors in 59% of precincts.<sup>15</sup> Voters in Florida faced intimidation; in North

9 DeSilver, "On Election Day."

10 Ellen Theisen, "Ballot-Scanner Voting System Failures in the News – A Partial List," VotersUnite, May 22, 2009, <http://www.votersunite.org/info/OpScansIn-theNews.pdf> describes 186 malfunctions. Scanners have roughly one-third the number of failures that DREs have.

11 DeSilver, "On Election Day."

12 DeSilver, "On Election Day."

13 Philip Bump, "1.7 million people in 33 states and D.C. cast a ballot without voting in the presidential race," *Washington Post*, December 14, 2016, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/14/1-7-million-people-in-33-states-and-dc-cast-a-ballot-without-voting-in-the-presidential-race/?utm\\_term=.ce6f41059f85](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/14/1-7-million-people-in-33-states-and-dc-cast-a-ballot-without-voting-in-the-presidential-race/?utm_term=.ce6f41059f85).

14 Bump, "1.7 million people."

15 Charlotte Alter, "Detroit Voting Machine Failures Were Widespread on Election Day," *Time*, December 14, 2016, <http://time.com/4599886/detroit-voting-machine-failures-were-widespread-on-election-day/>. "More than 80 voting machines in Detroit malfunctioned on Election Day, officials say, resulting in ballot discrepancies in 59% of precincts...." Jocelyn Benson, former dean of Wayne State Law School and founder of the Michigan Center for Election Law, who noted the large number of voters in the state who were recorded leaving their ballots partially blank [said,] "When you have 75,000 votes for president that are blank, that could be because 75,000 people didn't vote for President, or it could be because you have 75,000 votes that weren't counted."

Carolina and Colorado electronic voter lists (called "poll books") failed.<sup>16</sup> Voter ID laws disenfranchised some 200,000 voters in Wisconsin where Trump won by 22,748 votes.<sup>17</sup> Nearly 30 states used a program called Crosscheck to delete the names of likely Democratic voters from voter rolls, disenfranchising *millions* of eligible voters.<sup>18</sup>

My focus as an activist was observable handling of votes and tallies, but a wide variety of corrupt tactics were used in 2016. Why would cheaters work so hard when they could just switch votes? I believe their strategies fall into two tiers, visible and invisible. Visible fraud holds people's attention, while invisible, computerized fraud is the backup guarantee that pre-selected candidates are declared the winners. News commentators can ponder, "How did our pre-election polls get it wrong?" and "Why did so many voters change their mind at the last minute?" Jonathan Simon's *Code Red* supplies evidence of vote-switching, as well as how some corporate news media adjust opinion and exit polls to support announced election results.<sup>19</sup>

16 Mark Berman, William Wan, and Sari Horwitz, "Voters encounter some malfunctioning machines, other headaches on Election Day," *Washington Post*, November 8, 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/11/08/election-day-voters-report-long-lines-intimidation-and-confusion-in-some-parts-of-the-country/>.

17 Ari Berman, "Wisconsin's Voter-ID Law Suppressed 200,000 Votes in 2016 (Trump Won by 22,748)," *The Nation*, May 9, 2017, <https://www.thenation.com/article/wisconsins-voter-id-law-suppressed-200000-votes-trump-won-by-23000/>.

18 Greg Palast, "The GOP's Stealth War Against Voters," *Rolling Stone*, August 24, 2016, <http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/the-gops-stealth-war-against-voters-w435890>. A study completed after the 2016 election showed that Crosscheck purged approximately 300 valid voter registrations for each invalid one: Alison Bruzek, "Mass. Ended Its Participation In Controversial Voter Fraud System In March," WBUR Boston Radio, November 3, 2017, <http://www.wbur.org/radioboston/2017/11/03/massachusetts-crosscheck-system>. The study can be accessed through a link in the seventh paragraph of the article.

19 Jonathan Simon, *Code Red: Computerized Election Theft And The New American Century: Post-E2014 Edition*. (www.CODERED2014.com, 2015).

American elections have regressed to the wild days before lever machines were adopted when, at the end of the election day, poll site captains turned in empty ballot boxes with tally sheets reporting a large number of votes for one candidate and none for the other, judges wouldn't open the ballot boxes, police chiefs told officers at poll sites to look the other way, and so on.<sup>20</sup> A cartoon in *Harper's Weekly* in 1871 shows Boss Tweed of New York leaning on a ballot box on which is written "IN COUNTING THERE IS STRENGTH" while Tweed says, "As long as I count the Votes, what are you going to do about it?"<sup>21</sup> But Tweed had to do more than count votes. Similarly today, those who control our elections and nation use many strategies. We have to recognize, understand, and resist them all.

Concealment of votes and procedures is not inherent in election administration. Columbia County, New York, secures the ballots after each election via a simple, effective, bipartisan chain-of-custody protocol,<sup>22</sup> then hand-counts 100% of them to confirm scanner tallies. Many countries use paper ballots and

20 Joseph P. Harris, *Election Administration in the United States* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1934); Tracy Campbell, *Deliver the Vote* (New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 2005).

21 Thomas Nast, Caricature of Boss Tweed, *Harper's Weekly*, October 7, 1871, [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Boss\\_Tweed,\\_Nast.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Boss_Tweed,_Nast.jpg).

22 Virginia Martin, Election Commissioner, Columbia County, NY, "You can't count paper ballots. (Want to bet?)," The Election Verification Network 2017 Annual Conference, REFOCUS. RENEW. RE-INSPIRE, March 15-17, 2017, Washington, DC, <https://electionverification.org/evn-2017-conference/>. The presentation is described in part: "[T]he word is, even among election administrators, that you 'can't' count paper ballots. But Columbia County has been doing just that since 2010.... It isn't that hard, it doesn't take that long, and it doesn't cost that much...."

public hand-counting; in Germany<sup>23</sup> volunteers hand-count votes in front of observers as soon as the Election Day ends so authenticity of ballots and tallies is ensured by continuous observation. The Democratic and Republican election commissioners of one of New York's upstate counties, two elderly women, once told me, "We tell everyone what we're going to do. We tell 'em when and where. We tell 'em, you better show up and watch, because we don't want you coming around later and telling us we did it wrong."

Can computers be secured?<sup>24</sup> The 2005 FBI Computer Crime Survey—at that time the largest computer crime survey ever conducted—reported that 87% of organizations had security incidents within the last year; 44% had incidents perpetrated by their own insiders.<sup>25</sup> If these numbers hold true for election boards, it means that most will have intrusions, two in five by insiders.

23 Brad Friedman, "Democracy's Gold Standard, Hand-Marked, Hand-Counted Paper Ballots, Publicly Tabulated at Every Polling Place in America..." *Bradblog*, September 16, 2009, <http://bradblogger.com/?p=7417>. In March 2009, Germany's highest court effectively banned computerized voting and vote counting, finding that (1) "No 'specialized technical knowledge' can be required of citizens to vote or to monitor vote counts." (2) There is a "constitutional requirement of a publicly observed count." (3) "[T]he government substitution of its own check [or what we'd probably call an 'audit'] is no substitute...for public observation." (4) "A paper trail ...does not ...meet the above standards." Dagmar Breitenbach, "German election: Volunteers organize the voting and count the ballots," *Deutsche Welle*, September 19, 2017, <http://www.dw.com/en/german-election-volunteers-organize-the-voting-and-count-the-ballots/a-40562388>. Photographs and text explain the conduct of the German federal election on September 24, 2017, by approximately 650,000 volunteers.

24 In the information technology industry, computer systems achieve accuracy (also called "security") via routine, continuous, independent verification. The word "audit" describes any procedure that proves that the results of normal computer operation are accurate and not accessible to unauthorized persons. Independent audits are a universally accepted standard practice where people want accurate, private record-keeping in business, industry, and government, but America's computerized voting and vote-counting systems are not audited.

25 2005 FBI Computer Crime Survey, Federal Bureau of Investigation, January 2006, [http://www.wheresthepaper.org/FBI\\_ComputerCrimeSurvey2005.pdf](http://www.wheresthepaper.org/FBI_ComputerCrimeSurvey2005.pdf), pp. 7–8. See also [http://www.wheresthepaper.org/YahooNews060120FBI\\_MostCompaniesGetHacked.htm](http://www.wheresthepaper.org/YahooNews060120FBI_MostCompaniesGetHacked.htm), 2005.

Although the vast majority of election officials I met impressed me as committed to honest elections, the use of computers enables a single employee to corrupt an entire election.

Computer insecurity has worsened since 2005. Most people who put their personal data online are now worried about its security or know it has already been compromised. IBM President and CEO Ginni Rometty called cybercrime "the greatest threat to every profession, every industry, and every company in the world."<sup>26</sup> Verizon's "2016 Data Breach Investigations Report" warned, "No locale, no industry or organization is bulletproof when it comes to the compromise of data."<sup>27</sup> Of 1,000 IT leaders polled by Invincea, 75% reported that their networks had been breached in the last year.<sup>28</sup> When companies that know the most about security, more than any election board, can't protect their own data, it means that computers introduce unmanageable risks into our elections. What we need instead is huge numbers of people—as voters, poll workers, observers, and vote-counters.

Many election boards don't actually know how to program their own electronic equipment. Without vendor support, they would not be able to hold elections.<sup>29</sup> This has led to price gouging and spiraling costs.<sup>30</sup> Dependence also means that opportunity for cheating has been outsourced to vendor employees whom we

26 Bill Laberis, "20 Eye-Opening Cybercrime Statistics," *SecurityIntelligence*, November 14, 2016, <https://securityintelligence.com/20-eye-opening-cyber-crime-statistics/>.

27 Laberis, "20 Eye-Opening Cybercrime Statistics."

28 Laberis, "20 Eye-Opening Cybercrime Statistics."

29 Ellen Theisen, "Vendors are Undermining the Structure of U.S. Elections," *VotersUnite*, August 18, 2008, <http://www.votersunite.org/info/ReclaimElections.pdf>.

30 M. Mindy Moretti, "State and County Elections Offices Struggle with Economic Crisis," *Electionline.org*, February 20, 2009, <http://www.wheresthepaper.org/Electionline090220StateCtyElecOfficesEconomicCrisis.htm>.

have no reason to trust—they have not been elected or vetted, and are not answerable to the people.<sup>31</sup>

Regardless of technology over the years, election cheating has taken place when observers and investigators were not allowed to protect the vote.<sup>32</sup> But cheating in the past was localized. Each local boss controlled a limited territory—a neighborhood, city, county, or in rare cases a whole state. Today we have an infrastructure for nationwide control of election results. Over 90% of our election equipment was sold by three vendors who have continuing access to it because they provide the support services and ballot programming.<sup>33</sup> These machines have communications capability that allows votes and tallies to be modified by insiders or outside hackers anywhere in the world. Our corporate news media's focus on Russian hackers is, in part, a denial of our vulnerability to insiders.<sup>34</sup> You will hear the reassuring line, "there's no evidence our

31 Jennifer Cohn, "States have used taxpayer money to buy election systems from vendors with close past and/or current ties to a foreign dictator, a sophisticated cyberfelon, a Congressman, and the far-right Council for National Policy," *Medium*, January 28, 2018, <https://medium.com/@jennycohn1/updated-attachment-states-have-bought-voting-machines-from-vendors-controlled-and-funded-by-nation-6597e4dd3e70>.

32 Harris, *Election Administration in the United States*. Campbell, *Deliver the Vote*.

33 Lorin Hitt (faculty director), Simran Ahluwalia, Matthew Caulfield, Leah Davidson, Mary Margaret Diehl, Alina Ispas, Michael Windle, Matthew Caulfield, and Michael Windle, "The Business of Voting Market Structure and Innovation in the Election Technology Industry," Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative, 2016, <https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/business-of-voting/>. The report assessed market shares in the election technology industry: Election Systems and Software ("ES&S") 43.8%, Dominion Voting Systems 37.3%, and Hart Intercivic 11.0%.

34 A video suggesting our broad vulnerability is: Matteen Mokalla, Taige Jensen, J. Alex Halderman, "I Hacked an Election. So Can the Russians," *New York Times*, April 5, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/video/opinion/100000005790489/i-hacked-an-election-so-can-the-russians.html> and <https://www.verifiedvoting.org/verified-voting-hacks-into-voting-machine-in-new-video-from-the-new-york-times/>.

voting equipment has been subject to fraud." But you will rarely be told that smoking gun evidence was concealed or destroyed.<sup>35</sup> You will *not* hear the strong, pervasive forensic evidence activists have gathered—numerical, statistical, and pattern analysis with the same quality relied upon routinely in aerospace, economics, epidemiology, and other fields, and used by the USA to evaluate elections in other countries and call for investigation and election re-dos.<sup>36</sup>

There is a broader picture. Election administration is only one of many areas that have come under corporate control in the last five decades. An overview of what happened can help us understand how to reassert government by the people. In 1971, Lewis Powell, a corporate lawyer who later served fifteen years on the US Supreme Court, wrote a memorandum for the US Chamber of Commerce urging business leaders to use their money to exert more influence on American culture and government.<sup>37</sup> His memo is useful for study because it is a brief and explicit blueprint. The history behind it is revealed in books such as Kim Phillips-Fein's *Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan*.<sup>38</sup>

Powell called for pro-business influence on news media, universities, colleges, law schools, business schools, high schools,

35 Frank Bajak and Kathleen Foody, "Georgia official discounts threat of exposed voter records," APNews, June 16, 2017, <https://apnews.com/b96f4825faa7439a-b85af1d2459673c4>. See also Frank Bajak, "Georgia election server wiped after suit filed," APNews, October 27, 2017, <https://apnews.com/877ee1015f1c43f1965f63538b035d3f>.

36 Simon.

37 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., "Attack on the American Free Enterprise System" (Confidential memorandum written for and internally published by the US Chamber of Commerce, 1971), <http://www.wheresthepaper.org/PowellMemoForUSChamberOfCommerce1971.pdf>.

38 Kim Phillips-Fein, *Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2009).



textbook revisions, and staffers and elected officials at the national, state, and local levels. His memo was followed by unprecedented political organizing by business executives, detailed in Ted Nace's *Gangs of America*.<sup>39</sup>

Electronic voting arose in the context of corporate and financial interests' increasing activism and power. Our leading good government groups<sup>40</sup> appeared to have been influenced at their national levels during the 1990s. By the time HAVA passed, authorizing nearly four billion dollars for states to purchase new voting equipment, these groups had somehow forgotten that election integrity depends on observation. They insisted that computers were secure, and that new voting technology should be selected based on modernity, convenience, quick election results, and accessibility for voters with disabilities.<sup>41</sup> They advocated open government and oversight by the people in other areas but not in elections: the computers they touted had proprietary, trade-secret software; even if the software had been released to computer scientists for inspection, no one could guarantee that the same software would be used on election day; moreover, election legitimacy depends on average people observing understandable election procedures, not computer scientists evaluating software.

39 Ted Nace, *Gangs of America* (Oakland: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2003). For Chapter 12, see <http://wheresthepaper.org/GangsOfAmericaCh12TheRevoltOfTheBosses.pdf>.

40 Groups I unsuccessfully tried to inform about computer vulnerability included ACLU (national and New York State levels), Common Cause (New York State level), PFAW (New York State level), Leadership Council on Civil Rights (national level), and the League of Women Voters (national level; at the 2004 and 2006 national conventions I helped craft their position on voting technology. The New York State LWV was responsive.).

41 For example: Teresa Hommel, "ACLU Position on Electronic Voting Systems, 20 Comments by Teresa Hommel," *WheresThePaper*, November 23, 2007, [http://www.wheresthepaper.org/ACLU\\_Policy\\_comments.htm](http://www.wheresthepaper.org/ACLU_Policy_comments.htm). A copy of the ACLU policy is at [http://www.wheresthepaper.org/ACLU\\_Policy\\_322b\\_Electronic\\_Voting\\_amended\\_10.2007.pdf](http://www.wheresthepaper.org/ACLU_Policy_322b_Electronic_Voting_amended_10.2007.pdf).

In December 2003, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) held a conference called "Building Trust & Confidence in Voting Systems."<sup>42</sup> Jim Dickson, the leading spokesman for accessible voting for persons with disabilities, who is himself blind, represented the American Association of People With Disabilities (AAPD) and addressed a plenary session.<sup>43</sup> He advocated touch screen voting because "Voters can hear the ballot using headphones & cast their vote in complete privacy. Voters who are paralyzed, using adaptive tools, can cast their vote in complete privacy." He didn't say that the same adaptive tools would enable such voters to use any type of equipment. Whether or not Dickson knew that courts had never allowed inspection of electronic voting or vote-counting equipment after its use in an election, he repeated the mantra "There is no documented case of an election being changed with computer tabulation." He opposed paper trails, asking, "How does the voter know the paper ballot he sees accurately reflects what is recorded in the computer?" He didn't ask how a voter knows a touch screen accurately reflects what is recorded in the computer.

Dickson and the groups that used similar talking points could have demanded accessible equipment that did not shut out observers or depend on false ideas of computer security. They could have supported accessible ballot marking devices along with publicly observed, hand-to-eye vote counts at close of polls, a solution advocated by most election integrity activists nationwide. Blind voters in Rhode Island were already voting independently using *tactile ballots*. The VotePAD, a tactile ballot usable by blind

42 "Building Trust & Confidence in Voting Systems," National Institute of Standards and Technology, December 10–11, 2003, [www.nist.gov/itl/voting/building-trust-confidence-voting-systems](http://www.nist.gov/itl/voting/building-trust-confidence-voting-systems).

43 Jim Dickson, "Voter Verified Paper Ballot: De facto Discrimination Against Americans with Disabilities," National Institute of Standards and Technology, December 11, 2003, <https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/itl/vote/1-Dickson.pdf>.

voters as well as 80% of voters with mobility limitations, was in development.<sup>44</sup> Other accessible devices could have been easily implemented, such as the front panel for lever machines described above.

But the money did not flow that way. The National Federation for the Blind received a million-dollar donation from Diebold, then a prominent vendor of touch screen voting machines,<sup>45</sup> and used disability lawsuits to force companies and election boards to purchase Diebold equipment.<sup>46</sup> Dickson's organization AAPD received generous donations from large corporations who were thanked on AAPD's website. Some persons with disabilities objected that computerized voting might not be voting at all, but they got no traction.<sup>47</sup>

I kept lugging my laptop with *Fraudo* to meetings and conferences. Some good government groups ignored me, others criticized my message, saying it would discourage people from

44 I received sample tactile ballots from the Rhode Island Board of Elections and the developers of VotePAD. For online images and description of a tactile ballot, see Douglas W. Jones, "Handicapped Access to Mark-Sense Ballots," 2006, <http://homepage.divms.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/access/>. "Toolkit on Disability for Africa," United Nations Division for Social Policy Development (DSPD) Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), 2014 or later, <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/disability/Toolkit/Participationin-Political-Publiclife.pdf>, includes instructions for use of tactile ballots in Africa.

45 Opinion, "The Disability Lobby and Voting," *New York Times*, June 11, 2004, [http://www.wheresthepaper.org/NYT/NYT06\\_11DisabilityLobbyAndVoting.htm](http://www.wheresthepaper.org/NYT/NYT06_11DisabilityLobbyAndVoting.htm).

46 Bev Harris, "Diebold and the National Federation for the Blind," *BlackBox-Voting*, June 16, 2004, [http://www.wheresthepaper.org/Diebold\\_NFB.pdf](http://www.wheresthepaper.org/Diebold_NFB.pdf). "Late-Breaking News Diebold and NFB Partner to Develop Next Generation Voice-Guided ATMs," *The Braille Monitor*, November 1, 2000, <https://nfb.org/images/nfb/publications/bm/bm00/bm0012/bm001202.htm>. Devin Shultz, "Blind group withdrawing voting machine lawsuit," *Lancaster Eagle Gazette*, June 15, 2004, [http://www.wheresthepaper.org/EagleGazo6\\_15BlindWithdrawLawsuit.htm](http://www.wheresthepaper.org/EagleGazo6_15BlindWithdrawLawsuit.htm).

47 Brad Friedman, "BLIND AND DISABLED VOTER ADVOCATES, GROUPS CALL FOR 'IMMEDIATE BAN' OF DRE VOTING SYSTEMS!," *Bradblog*, March 14, 2007, <http://www.bradblog.com/?p=4270>.

voting. When I said that electronic voting equipment would allow undetectable tampering with elections, I was called a conspiracy theorist. I couldn't make sense of it all. I could see the connection between the campaign against hanging chads and old election equipment, passage of HAVA, vendor competition for HAVA money, and intent to establish an infrastructure for invisible control of elections. But the large number of people, good government groups, companies, and governmental entities that all mouthed the same lies was evidence of an overarching context that I couldn't fathom. Frankly, the situation could not have existed without some well-organized, long-range planning, whether you called it a conspiracy or not.

Our nation's ideas about what makes a good election seemed to shift. We went from "get it right on election night" meaning "have enough election staff and observers to determine accurate tallies as soon as the polls close" to "if the tallies are potentially verifiable we don't need verification." We went from knowing that observers are the only way to get honest elections and people have to show up in person to do that work, to thinking that watching election returns on TV is good enough and we should "trust" our election administrators.

After all our talk about verification and recounts, we need to step back and ask whether recounts are really a safeguard. In many states recounts are allowed only for extremely close races, are prohibitively expensive, and can't be obtained by a non-candidate or non-affected candidate. We can rarely observe the chain of custody of ballots before recounts occur, and many jurisdictions recount by feeding ballots through the same questionably programmed and calibrated scanners. The routine recounts that most states mandate are too small to discover most fraud.<sup>48</sup> Some

48 Thirty-two states require audits of some kind. National Conference of State Legislatures, "Post-Election Audits," March 28, 2018, <http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/post-election-audits635926066.aspx#state req's>.

election officials simply refuse to allow recounts or inspection of ballots, or destroy evidence, regardless of the law.<sup>49</sup>

Jill Stein, 2016 Green Party presidential candidate, sought recounts in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, hoping to uncover evidence of almost certain fraud. She cited, for example, the high number of ballots from black, Democratic-leaning Michigan precincts with no vote for president. In Michigan and Pennsylvania Trump petitioned the courts to stop the recounts, and they were aborted. In Wisconsin, counties with large anomalies only fed their ballots through the same scanners again. In all three states the election boards and state officials used financial, legal, administrative, and delaying tactics to prevent meaningful recounts or visual inspection of ballots. They asserted that no problems had been revealed, meanwhile doing everything in their power to prevent revelation. Jill Stein described our situation: "[A]n un-recountable election is a blank check for fraud and malfeasance."<sup>50</sup>

To prevent a president unelected by voters in 2020, we have to look at voting equipment from another viewpoint. I believe our most important task is to preserve the Electoral College; it keeps hackers and insiders from making full use of our national infrastructure for vote-switching because falsely inflated tallies for a candidate in one state can only affect the Electoral College votes of that state, not the Electoral College votes of other states.

But what if all the people's votes nationwide were reported together, one total number per candidate, and the Electoral

College had to give the presidency to the candidate with the most votes? Greatly inflated tallies from some states would outweigh more accurate tallies from other states. Further, as Jonathan Simon explains, getting rid of the Electoral College, if not coupled with observable vote counting, would enable election riggers to shift votes anywhere in our country with equal impact, and more easily escape the minimal scrutiny that we currently give to battleground states.<sup>51</sup> The math for such a coup was published by four Yale University students who show that switching one vote per electronic voting or vote-counting machine can change the outcome of most national elections: Changing two or more could "establish, or overcome, a considerable margin of victory."<sup>52</sup>

After the 2016 election some commentators urged us to get rid of the Electoral College because it was created in 1787 to limit the power of the people's votes to elect the president, and is a vestige of slavery.<sup>53</sup> To me, history is less crucial than keeping vote-switching from electing our next president. If the Electoral College affected baseball, we would be analyzing how it helps or hurts every player and team, and their game strategies past and future. Elections are more competitive, the secret plays more complex, the stakes higher—but we have no drug tests for the equipment or slow-motion replays. We have seen no in-depth analysis, nor will

<sup>51</sup> Simon, p. 46.

<sup>52</sup> Anthony Di Franco, Andrew Petro, Emmett Shear, and Vladimir Vladimirov, "Small Vote Manipulations Can Swing Elections," *Communications of the ACM*, October 2004, Vol. 47, No. 10, <http://www.wheresthepaper.org/ACM.pdf>.

<sup>53</sup> Dan Kennedy, "Yes, The Electoral College Really Is A Vestige Of Slavery. It's Time To Get Rid Of It," WGBH, December 6, 2016, <https://news.wgbh.org/2016/12/06/news/yes-electoral-college-really-vestige-slavery-its-time-get-rid-it>. See also Akhil Reed Amar, "The Troubling Reason the Electoral College Exists," *Time*, November 8, 2016, <http://time.com/4558510/electoral-college-history-slavery/>. See also Rich Barlow, "The Electoral College Was Born In Racism. Let's Drop Out," WBUR, December 30, 2016, <http://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2016/12/30/abolish-the-electoral-college-rich-barlow>.

<sup>49</sup> For example: Warren Richey, "Why did Broward destroy 2016 ballots? Sanders ally seeks US probe," *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 15, 2017, <https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2017/1215/Why-did-Broward-destroy-2016-ballots-Sanders-ally-seeks-US-probe>.

<sup>50</sup> Jill Stein, "Recount Update: January 25, 2018," Jill2016, January 25, 2018, <https://www.jill2016.com/recount>. See also "With Multi-State Presidential Recount Over, Stein Campaign Ends Fundraising Drive," December 13, 2016, [https://www.jill2016.com/fundraising\\_ends](https://www.jill2016.com/fundraising_ends).

we because the elephant in the room—vote-switching—is taboo to mention.<sup>54</sup>

National Popular Vote (NPV) is a group that has worked for years to persuade states to sign a legal agreement to award all their electoral votes to the presidential candidate with the most popular votes nationwide.<sup>55</sup> The agreement will come into effect after it represents enough Electoral College votes to control a presidential election. By the end of 2017, the agreement had 61% of what it needed. Groups such as Common Cause and Daily Kos advocate for it.

NPV has no interest in observable elections. They use economic arguments: candidates spend more money in swing states, which also receive more federal money and benefit more from presidential policy decisions. NPV also uses feelings-of-voters arguments: battleground states receive more attention, so people living elsewhere feel politically marginalized and muted.<sup>56</sup> These are real economic and emotional issues, but bypassing the Electoral College is not an appropriate solution. Further, NPV says our state-based winner-take-all Electoral College system

54 The publicity against the Electoral College since the 2016 election resembles that in 2000 against hanging chads and for computerized elections. Both campaigns ignore democracy's need for the people's oversight of elections; both rely on the people's ignorance of election administration as if elections ran themselves or were run by angels. Our computerized voting now prevents oversight, but one state's tallies don't affect other states yet. Eliminating the Electoral College will end that limitation. So far the public is not asking why America's history of slavery is being used to anger and distract us, why modernity is being touted as a panacea like it was in 2000, and why we are being urged again to make a major change in our election administration without analysis of its *current* strengths and weaknesses and without discussion of how this change will make things better or worse.

55 <https://www.nationalpopularvote.com>. The District of Columbia, although not a state, has three Electoral College votes and has signed the NPV contract.

56 John R. Koza, "At the next presidential election, the popular vote must win out," *The Guardian*, November 10, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/10/at-the-next-presidential-election-the-popular-vote-must-win-out>.

makes some people feel like not every vote counts.<sup>57</sup> Note that NPV doesn't urge states to allocate their Electoral College votes proportional to their statewide tallies, which might make those people feel better without enabling switched votes to elect our president.

The folks at NPV are undoubtedly aware of America's infrastructure for computerized nationwide cheating, the potential for nationwide fraud published by the Yale students, and the role of the Electoral College in limiting the effect of vote-switching to the state in which it occurs.<sup>58</sup> But are our state legislators equally informed? We need to share this information with them. States like New York that have already passed a law to participate in the National Popular Vote agreement need to be lobbied to repeal their law and withdraw from the compact. We also need to inform individuals who support NPV without awareness of its context or implications.

NPV won many converts after the 2016 election because Clinton appeared to receive 2.7 million popular votes more than Trump, yet he won the Electoral College. The situation is presented in simplified, inflammatory terms: let's get rid of our *old-fashioned* Electoral College that put Trump in the White House. But the frantic efforts to avoid recounts or visual inspection of ballots requested by Jill Stein suggest that Trump's win resulted from dishonest single-party election administration behind locked doors that prevented likely Democrats from voting, disqualified tallies from heavily Democratic precincts due to minor errors by poll workers, deleted votes, and employed myriad other tactics to ensure Trump's win. The solution we need is multi-party election

57 Koza, "At the next presidential election, the popular vote must win out."

58 "Biographies," NationalPopularVote, February 2018. John Koza, originator of the National Popular Vote agreement, has a PhD in computer science and a long-standing interest in the Electoral College. He published a board game involving Electoral College strategy in 1966. <https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/about>.

administration that facilitates citizen participation and oversight, and voting technology that facilitates meaningful observation.<sup>59</sup>

New York State requires bipartisan election administration with one Democrat and one Republican in each job. This can be unwieldy, but it minimizes insider opportunities for malfeasance. New York City's election commissioners meet in public, their meetings are online, and many pre- and post-election procedures are open for public observation. But even New York is not perfect. Over 126,000 voter registrations disappeared in Brooklyn in the 2016 presidential primary; there was fast recognition and response, however, rather than stonewalling and denial.<sup>60</sup>

Democracy is more than elections; it requires more from citizens than voting. There are many ways we can work to revitalize our democracy. We can spend more time discussing and analyzing governmental issues. Our social divides might become less rigid if we talk about policies on which we seem to disagree and try to discover common ground. There are books on how to discuss difficult subjects and reconcile with those from whom we have been estranged. Many people have a sense of what is fair or unfair; often we can form alliances even though we face different types of unfairness. Practice on your family and friends, who are both the hardest and easiest people to talk with. It can feel more comfortable to spend time with "people like me" and more important to work against our own oppression, but our relationships with others give us more strength. Further, we must

59 Other election issues include activists' fight against Instant Runoff Voting which is advocated as a convenience but requires computerization as well as mathematical knowledge beyond that of the average person; internet voting and overseas voting by fax which are the most insecure votes, and failure to consider that the data for most voting systems is on the internet at some time during the election process, despite common knowledge that nothing on the internet is secure.

60 "Officials investigating why 126,000 voters were purged from NY rolls," PBS, April 23, 2016, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/officials-investigating-why-126000-voters-were-purged-from-ny-rolls>.

distinguish between others who listen, show respect, and find compromises that allow us to move forward, and those who use dissention or disruption to prevent us from doing the work of self-government.

We need reliable sources of information about governmental policy and action. America once had many small, independent newspapers with differing points of view; their editors stood behind what they printed. Our anonymous, photoshopped internet content is not a replacement. Some Americans today favor British news sources such as *The Guardian*, others like political comment presented as comedy by Stephen Colbert, Trevor Noah, or John Oliver. Rachel Maddow, Amy Goodman, Thom Hartmann, and *Bradblog* are sources. In addition to simply receiving news, we must write letters to the editor, articles, and complaints when news is partial, biased, or not reported. For example, in 2016 our corporate media failed to report Jill Stein's daily struggle for recounts and the evasive tactics of officials in the three states.

Learning civics in school, age-appropriate starting in kindergarten, would help our children prepare to be active citizens. If families talk about governmental policies and how they affect us, our kids can develop skills to discuss, question, and evaluate. Democracy requires that kind of thinking. We can encourage those who are interested to prepare for careers in government.

Using elections as an example, we can see that people need to register voters, get out the vote, work and observe at poll sites, and campaign for candidates. In addition, some of us must work at the infrastructure level to ensure that voter registrations don't disappear, and watch the procedures before, during, and after elections. We need to monitor state and local laws and regulations, policy changes, and failure to follow legal procedures. We need to know who our candidates,<sup>61</sup> legislators, executives, and judges are,

61 Candidates may lie about their principles and party affiliation. For example, Matt Volz, "Green Party candidate was on state GOP payroll," *AP News*, March 13, 2018, <https://apnews.com/aae15528a9fe415282402c4e14090c75>.

and pay attention to what they say and do. By staying involved over the years we can develop a historical perspective so we know what questions to ask, how to interpret the answers, who is involved, and how to respond.

We can join a political club, work our way up, become the voice and decision-makers of our parties, and participate in making laws, policies, and procedures.

Doing things for the first time can be challenging, but if we persevere, the work of self-government gets easier and more interesting and exciting. We will meet and learn from role models. One critical skill to develop is time management so we don't neglect ourselves, or our family, friends, or jobs. We can tithe our free time to take care of our government—it's a kind of maintenance chore, like washing dishes.

It is probably true that some people may stop voting if they think our nation's elections have problems. If we don't educate people and make changes, however, our elections will become a mere ritual. Corrupt elections do not support democracy. Dictators have told us that: Josef Stalin declared, "It's not who votes that counts; it's who counts the votes." Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua boasted, "You won the vote, but I won the count."

I've been told that Americans won't show up to do the work of self-government. Yet in November 2016, I ran a poll site in New York City that served 15,000 voters. Knowing that we would be understaffed, I approached some organizations to get volunteers. More people came to help than we needed. In 2012 when Obama was elected for his second term, I ran a smaller poll site that was packed with voters from the moment we opened the doors at 6 A.M.; we could not serve them fast enough, so I climbed up on a chair and yelled that we needed help. Dozens of people changed their plans for the day and stayed to work, some till midnight. I believe people become active when they understand the need and urgency; our silence about problems robs others of the opportunity and choice to work for what they believe in.

Honest government, especially election administration, requires informed public scrutiny, discussion, and participation. The more we study and investigate our governmental bureaucracies that operate in secret, the more likely we are to figure out how to unlock their doors. At this time, as our president and Congress are dismantling our government, its institutions, and the rule of law, the only way to preserve and strengthen them is our persistent engagement and vigilance, and use of the Electoral College in 2020 to limit the effect of vote-switching to the states in which it occurs.